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The Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are 
promoting point/nonpoint trading as a way of reducing the costs of meeting water quality 
goals while giving nonpoint sources a larger role in meeting those goals.  Farms can 
create offsets or credits in a point/nonpoint trading program by implementing 
management practices such as conservation tillage, nutrient management, and buffer 
strips.  To be eligible to sell credits, farmers must first comply with baseline 
requirements.  The EPA defines a baseline as the pollutant control requirements that 
apply to a seller in the absence of trading.  EPA guidance recommends that the baseline 
for nonpoint sources be management practices that are consistent with the water quality 
goal.  A farmer would not be able to create credits until the minimum practice standards 
are met.  An alternative baseline is those practices being implemented at the time the 
trading program starts.  The selection of the baseline has major implications for which 
farmers benefit from trading, the cost of nonpoint source credits, and ultimately the 
number of credits that nonpoint sources can sell to regulated point sources.  We use a 
simple model of the average profit-maximizing dairy farmer operating in the Conestoga 
(PA) watershed to evaluate the implications of baseline requirements on the cost and 
quantity of credits that can be produced for sale in a water quality trading market, and 
which farmers benefit most from trading.  
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Water quality trading is now of much interest as a mechanism to improve the 
efficiency of water pollution control allocations among and between point and nonpoint 
sources in the U.S.  Under the Clean Water Act, point sources (e.g. factories, sewage 
treatment plants) are regulated through a non-tradable permit system.  A permit specifies 
how much of a particular pollutant the permit holder can discharge.  Traditionally, 
permittees were required to meet their permit obligations through effluent reductions for 
the permitted source.  New U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) policy 
guidelines on water quality trading now allow points sources to meet their permit 
requirements through offsets from other sources (US EPA 2004).
i   Under the EPA policy 
guidelines, those sources may be regulated point sources, or unregulated nonpoint 
sources.  The guidelines encourage States to consider agriculture as a source of offsets in 
water quality trading programs, and many states are either implementing or considering 
water quality trading programs that allow point-nonpoint source trading (Environmental 
Trading Network, 2009; U.S. EPA, 2009). 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is also very interested in water 
quality trading.  In 2006, a new Department policy on market-based environmental 
stewardship was announced (USDA, 2006).  The goal of the policy is to broaden the use 
of markets for providing environmental and ecosystem services through market 
mechanisms, such as credit trading.  Such markets could provide a source of income to 
farmers and reward them for engaging in conservation activities. Farms can create offsets 
or credits for the market by implementing management practices such as conservation 
tillage, nutrient management, and buffer strips.  Since the price is determined in the marketplace, payments are not limited to the cost or a fraction of the costs of the practice, 
as in most conservation programs.  Farmers can also receive a payment for a much longer 
period of time than the 2 to 5 years of a standard conservation program contract. 
Point/nonpoint trading has not been very successful to date, at least in terms of the 
participation of potential traders and the number of trades between regulated sources and 
farms (Breetz et al., 2004).  Much has been written about various issues related to 
point/nonpoint trading, including uncertainty, trading ratios, and validation issues (King, 
2005; King and Kuch ,2003; Woodward and Kaiser, 2002; Ribaudo and Nickerson, 
2009).  One area of program design that has not received much attention is the 
establishment of a baseline.  To be eligible to sell credits, farmers must first comply with 
baseline requirements.  The selection of the baseline has major implications for the cost 
of nonpoint source credits in the market, and ultimately the number of credits that 
nonpoint sources can sell to regulated point sources.   
In this paper, we use a simple model of the dairy farms operating in the Conestoga 
watershed (Pennsylvania) to evaluate the implications of baseline participation 
requirements on the cost and quantity of credits that can be produced for sale in a 
point/non point water quality trading market. The Conestoga is a major source of 
nutrients entering the Susquehanna River, which is in turn a leading source of nutrients 
entering the Bay (Belval and Sprague, 1999).  Reducing agricultural nutrient loads in the 
Conestoga has long been an objective of water quality agencies concerned with water 
quality in Pennsylvania and the Chesapeake Bay.  Since 2007, farmers in the watershed 
have had the opportunity to participate in a nutrient credit trading program established by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection for the Susquehanna Basin in 2007.  Although the program has received much attention as innovation in point/nonpoint 
trading, analogous to other programs, participation and trade volumes limited.     
 
Baseline rules in water quality trading programs 
The EPA defines a baseline participation requirement (BPR) as the pollutant 
control requirements that apply to a seller in the absence of trading (U.S. EPA, 2007).  A 
seller must meet its baseline requirements to be eligible to generate credits.  EPA 
guidance recommends that where a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) is in place, the 
“load allocation” for nonpoint sources should serve as the threshold for nonpoint sources 
to generate credits (U.S. EPA, 2007).  A load allocation defines the nonpoint source load 
reductions necessary to achieve water quality standards, and where available, can be 
applied to individual nonpoint sources or, more commonly, to the sector as a whole.  EPA 
guidance states that it would not support a trading program that allows nonpoint sources 
to sell credits if the discharge is contributing to water quality impairments (U.S. EPA, 
2007).  However, EPA recognizes that there are difficulties associated with estimating 
loads from nonpoint sources.  
In watersheds where a TMDL does not exist, or where the load allocation is 
uncertain, the program can establish other baseline requirements, including practices 
existing at the time the trading program was established, or implementation of a 
minimum set of best management practices (BMP).   
The potential for a baseline to require something other than current practices 
presents an interesting dilemma for program managers.  Under the Clean Water Act, 
there are no requirements for nonpoint sources to adopt BMPs, even in the presence of a TMDL.  By requiring a minimum practice standard (MPS) as the BPR to participate in 
the market, the regulatory agency may be disqualifying the “lowest hanging fruit”; the 
least costly reductions cannot be offered as offsets.  It is possible that the incentives 
present in a credit market will be insufficient to induce farms that have not already 
voluntarily adopted the minimum set of practices, so called “good actors,” to incur the 
cost of meeting the BPR.  This entry cost would therefore potentially limit participation 
and adversely affect the efficiency of the market. 
One beneficiary of a MPS is prior adopters, or good actors, who are protected 
from competition from farms that can provide pollution abatement at a lower cost, 
because “bad actors” choose not to participate in the market.  This would result in higher 
credit prices for point sources, and fewer credits being purchased from agriculture.  If 
nonpoint source participation is a secondary goal of the program, then the minimum-
standard baseline would appear to work against it.  Water quality problems associated 
with “bad actors” will remain unaddressed, at least through the trading program. 
   
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program 
  The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) has clear 
criteria for point source and nonpoint source participation in nutrient trading programs 
specific to the Chesapeake Bay watershed (PADEP, 2008a).  The criteria for agricultural 
nonpoint sources take the form of baseline and threshold requirements.  The baseline 
requirement is that on-site operations must be in compliance with Chapter 102 Erosion & 
Sedimentation Regulations, Section 91.36 (Agricultural Operations), Act 38 Nutrient 
Management Regulations, and Chapter 92 (CAFOs), as applicable.  Compliance is determined by a site visit by PADEP staff or a PADEP approved entity and verified by 
PADEP, the Conservation District or other PADEP-approved entity.   
  Threshold requirements are met when one of three conditions is met.  The first 
condition is that a 100 foot mechanical setback or equivalent is implemented on-site.  It 
either requires that no surface waters exist within 100 feet of the farm or that manure is 
not mechanically applied within 100 feet of surface water or that manure is not applied at 
all and that commercial fertilizer application rates are below Penn State recommended 
agronomic rates.  The second condition is that a 35 foot buffer or equivalent is planted 
between the field and surface water.  The buffer is a swathe of permanent vegetation 
maintained between the field and surface water.  Common types of buffer are riparian 
forest buffers and riparian grass buffers.  The third condition is that the farm’s overall 
nutrient balance be reduced by 20% below what is required by the baseline requirement 
presented earlier.  For the purposes of our analysis, and for the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that all simulated farms meet their threshold requirements by satisfying the 
second condition, i.e. a 35 foot strip of permanent vegetation is planted between the field 
and surface water. 
 
Analytical model 
The numerical analysis uses a model of agricultural production and pollution 
control based on characteristics of the Conestoga River watershed in Lancaster Co., PA.  
The Conestoga is a major source of nutrients from agricultural production entering the 
Susquehanna River, which is in turn a major source of nutrients entering the Chesapeake 
Bay.  Reducing agricultural nutrient loads in the Conestoga has long been an objective of water quality agencies concerned with water quality in Pennsylvania and the Chesapeake 
Bay.  The model simulates nitrogen pollution loads from agricultural sources from sub-
watersheds of the Conestoga.  The model is not intended to be a highly explicit 
representation of agricultural production in the watershed.  Instead it is intended to serve 
as a platform for testing the effects of alternative specifications of BPRs on the efficiency 
and equity of water quality trading.   
Agricultural nutrient loads in the watershed are especially associated with 
livestock agriculture.  Dairy production is very important in the Conestoga watershed in 
terms of land use, farm income, and nutrient loads.  The Conestoga watershed is located 
primarily in Lancaster County, PA (figure 1).  The 2002 Census of Agriculture (USDA, 
NASS, 2002) reported that sales of livestock related products accounted for 
approximately 89% of the total market value of production for the county.  Milk and 
other dairy products account for the largest fraction of livestock related products in 
Lancaster County.  Generating baselines for dairy farms is also important because to a 
greater extent than poultry and hog operations, dairy farms participate in farm programs 
that may affect incentives to participate in trading.  Accordingly, we focus our model on 
dairy production. 
The dairy production model is highly stylized and simplified to maintain focus on 
the mass flow of nutrients and the management of manure and runoff, which are the main 
concerns for water quality management, water quality trading, and conservation 
programs.  The nutritional needs of dairy herds are met through nutrients in purchased 
feeds, nutrients from crops produced on the farm, and from pasturing.  Dairy herds are 
poor processors of nutrients with 50-75 percent of the nutrients in the feed ending up in the manure (CAST, 2002).  Traditionally, manure is spread on crop land.  Nitrogen 
applied to crop land can have several fates.  Some is taken up by crops, some is volatized, 
some leaches into ground waters, and some runs off into surface waters.  In the 
Conestoga watershed, the volume of nutrients applied is substantially in excess of what is 
taken up in crops, leaving a large pool of nutrients to move into air and water.   
In the stylized model, profits from milk production are described by a restricted 
profit function conditioned on herd size or number of cows,  , and corn produced 
onsite,  .  The herd’s feed requirement is completely met by corn grown onsite.  All 
corn is assumed to be fed, thus there is no marketing of corn.  This is consistent with the 
structure of Lancaster Co. farming, where corn is produced mainly as an animal feed.  
The animal manure (M) is spread on crop land and, supplemented by purchased fertilizer 
(N), to provide nutrients to the corn crop.  The farm size, in terms of land, is fixed.  In the 
baseline model (without trading), the continuous production variables in the stylized farm 
models are the herd size, onsite corn production, and purchased fertilizer.  The proportion 
of pasture land is fixed.  Land in corn production is continuous up to an upper bound.   
Discontinuous variables are manure management practices and runoff control practices.   
Nutrient losses to the water resources from a farm can be reduced by: 
(1) Reducing the volume of nutrients applied to crop land.  This can be accomplished 
through feeding strategies that reduce the volume of nutrients in manure, storage 
strategies that increase the volatilization of nitrogen, disposing of nutrients off-
site, reducing the volume of manure production, and thus the herd size, and 
reducing applications of commercial fertilizer.     (2) Increasing the utilization of nutrients.  This can be accomplished by developing 
crop strains that have higher nutrient absorption capabilities, changing soil 
chemistry, and changing manure chemistry to facilitate nutrient uptake.   
(3) Reducing nutrient runoff.  This can be accomplished by implementing on-field 
tillage practices and off-field interception practices.  Reduced tillage reduces 
surface runoff, allowing water and associated nutrients to percolate into the soil 
profile.  Filter strips absorb nutrients not absorbed by the crop and so reduce 
runoff.   
In our analysis we focus on three best management practices (BMP):  conservation 
tillage, nutrient management plan (NMP), and riparian grass buffers (RGB). 
 
Mathematical Structure: No trading – no explicit representation of BMPs 
Farm behavior is modeled using a dual approach that allows the number of choice 
variables to be limited to the policy relevant set.  The restricted profit function for the 
profit maximizing dairy farm is 
    ￿￿￿  ￿
where   represents revenues from milk sales,   is the corn production cost 
function,  is the unit cost of herd maintenance and   is the cost of implementing 
conservation practice  .    captures all non-feed costs and includes the costs of 
acquiring and housing cattle.  The linear form implies that the marginal herd maintenance 
cost is constant.   This specification reflects our focus on long run equilibrium responses.  
We expect farm profits to be increasing and concave in both   and  . The revenue function for milk sales approximated by a second order Taylor’s 
Series expansion about the pre-trading levels of   and  . 
    ￿￿￿  ￿
where  ,  ,  ,  ,   and   are parameters associated with the Taylor’s 
Series expansion.  The second order Taylor’s Series expansion allows flexibility in 
modeling revenue response to the input variables,   and  .  Differentiating  , the 
first order conditions with respect to   and   are   and   
respectively.  The signs on the first order conditions will determine the marginal response 
of revenue to the inputs respectively.  Ex ante we expect corn production and herd size to 
have positive effects on farm revenue:  we expect that   and 
. 
We assume that the only feedstuff fed to the herd is corn.
1  We also assume that 
all feedstuff necessary for herd sustenance is grown onsite.  The farmer does not buy any 
corn on the open market.  The corn production cost function   is determined 
analytically by solving an expenditure minimization problem (EMP), where expenditure 
is on market inputs needed for corn production.  It is assumed that the only input needed 
for corn production is nitrogen, as a nutrient.  Some of the nitrogen is obtained from 
manure produced onsite by the herd.  The rest is bought from the market.  The 
relationship between corn,  , and nitrogen,  , is often modeled as quadratic or as a 
linear plateau (Fox and Piekielek, 1983; Dillon and Anderson, 1990).  Following the 
recommendation in Ghosh (2004), in this study the relationship between   and   is 
captured by a bounded exponential function (3), which retains salient features of the 
                                                 
1 Or it can be assumed that non-corn feed units are transformed into equivalent corn feed units, allowing all 
nutrient calculations to be made in terms of corn quadratic and linear plateau functions.  The initial response of corn yield to nitrogen is 
similar to the quadratic formulation and the asymptotic response is similar to the linear 
plateau. 
    ￿￿￿  ￿
 and   are model parameters, the values of which are determined through 
calibration and presented in Ghosh (2004).  The parameters vary by land capability class 
(LCC).  Since there are four LCCs in the Conestoga watershed, there are four sets of 
values for the  s. 
The nitrogen ( ) needed for corn production is obtained from two sources: from 
manure obtained onsite and from fertilizer purchased in the open market at price  .  If 
 is the nitrogen content of onsite manure and   is the nitrogen content in the 
fertilizer bought in the market, then total nitrogen input  .  Let   be the 
manure produced by the herd and let   be the proportion of nitrogen in manure.  It 
follows that the nitrogen content in manure,  .  If   is the quantity of manure 
produced by each cow and   is the number of cows then manure  .  Let   be 
farm size.  The farmer minimizes corn production costs by minimizing expenditure on 
, the only market input.  If   is the minimum amount of corn needed to feed the herd, 
then the farmer faces the constraint  .  The farmer’s constrained EMP for food 
production is set out in (4) and (5) and the farmer optimizes over  .  The optimum level 






￿￿￿  ￿ 
 
￿￿￿  ￿
  By substituting   into the objective function of the EMP, the minimized cost 




From Euler’s Theorem, it is known that  , 
where  and   are the farm’s corn production cost-minimizing levels of corn and herd 
size.  The partial derivatives are evaluated at their optima.  As is common in the 
literature,   and    are interpreted as the shadow or implicit prices of corn 
(SC) and herd size (SK) when considered as inputs in corn production.  SC and SK are 







Specific values of SC and SK , which are necessary for the calibration, will be 
known if the optimal values of   and the  s are known.  If the farmer is an 
optimizer then the Euler’s Theorem can be used, which implies that instead of (8), 
 can be substituted into (1) instead.  The substitution is useful because the 
nonlinearity of   in C
* would have complicated the calibration process.   
Calibration 
Some model parameter will be assigned values obtained from the literature.  
Other model parameters will be calibrated.  Parameter values obtained from the literature include herd maintenance unit costs (PK), herd size (K), costs of conservation tillage 
(Q(TS)), and costs of nitrogen (PN).  An estimate for non-feed herd maintenance costs was 
obtained from Bailey (2008):  PK = 3600.  Hence the total cost of herd maintenance, PKK 
= 3600K.  The average herd size for Conestoga herds as listed in the 2002 Census of 
Agriculture (USDA, 2003) is 56.  We assume that the herd is composed of Holsteins, 
which implies that the average herd size is 62.2 animal units (AU).   
Comparison of conventional till, reduced till, and no-till in corn production 
reveals total variable costs for conventional till (TV) to be $4 to $8 less per acre than 
variable costs for no-till (Pennsylvania State University, 1996).  No-tillers are referred to 
as conservation tillers in this report.  The midpoint of $6 per acre is chosen as the extra 
cost of implementing conservation till (TS).  Since there are 40 acres under corn 
production, Q(TS) = 240.  
Statistics for the manure generated per cow per year (  tons) and the 
nitrogen proportion in manure (  kg / ton) are obtained from the 2007-2008 
Agronomy Guide (Penn State, 2007b).  The cost of nitrogen (PN) is set to the official 
April 2007 price for nitrogen fertilizer (USDA, 2008).  The values assigned to ￿0, ￿1 and 
￿2 and total nitrate use, N, are taken from Ghosh (2004).  The ￿s vary across LCCs  to 
reflect heterogeneity in soil quality and fertility.  C is obtained by substituting the optimal 
values of the ￿s and N into (3).  C varies by LCC because the ￿s, as calibrated in Ghosh 
(2004), vary by LCC. 
The other model parameters are a, bC, bK, ￿C, ￿K and ￿CK, all associated with the 
milk revenue function (2).  a is simply a scaling variable and ensures that calibrated 
results approximate real world revenues and profits for real dairy farms in the Conestoga watershed.  bC, bK, ￿C, ￿K and ￿CK capture the quadratic relationship between revenue and 
inputs and are calibrated.   
The model has five unknown parameters needing calibration, ￿C, ￿K, ￿CK, bC, bK.  
The final unknown parameter a acts as a scaling variable and is easily calculated when 
the other parameter values are known.  The first and second equations are obtained from 
the first order necessary conditions for profit maximization, which are obtained by 
differentiating (1) with respect to C and K.  Rearranging these first order conditions 







As (10) and (11) indicate, optimal levels of C and K are linear in the prices of K 
and C.  SC and SK are the marginal implicit prices of corn and herd size in the production 
of corn and are given by (7) and (8).  PK is the unit non-feed cost of the herd and hence SK 
+ PK is the total unit cost of herd maintenance. 
For the last three equations we derive the farmer’s own and cross price supply 










The own price elasticity of dairy production with respect to corn costs,  , was 
obtained from Chavas and Klemme (1986), who estimate short-run, medium-run and long-run elasticities.  Their numbers for medium-run elasticity – the medium-run is 
defined as ten years – are used, which implies that  .  We were unable to find 
estimates of the own price elasticity of dairy production with respect to herd costs and the 
cross price elasticities.  We set  .    is negative because it is assumed that 
K is a normal good and hence ceteris paribus herd size will diminish as costs increase.  
Also, since  , herd size is relatively inelastic in its response to price, 
which is explained as follows: There are fixed and variable costs associated with the 
herd.  The fixed costs are sunk and unchanging in the medium-run.  They are associated 
with the physical infrastructure needed to maintain the herd.  The physical infrastructure 
will maintain a herd of a given size and to use this infrastructure to the maximum, the 
farmer will try to keep his herd as large as he can.  Variable cost changes in the medium-
run and hence   measures the effect that changes in variable costs have on milk 
supply.  A rise in variable cost will exert a downward pressure on herd size and milk 
supply, but this pressure is mitigated by the incentive that the farmer has to not reduce 
herd size and utilize his physical infrastructure optimally.  These conflicting incentives 
will manifest in a relatively inelastic herd size response to increases in medium-run herd 
maintenance costs.   
We set   because it is assumed   and   are complements 
rather than substitutes.  The magnitude of the cross price supply response is unknown, but 
sensitivity analysis did not reveal much variation in the calibration results when 
 was varied about one.  We solve the system of five equations [(10)—(14)] to 
calibrate the five unknown parameters,  C b ,  K b ,  C l ,  K l , and CK l .   
Pre-market conditions 
  For the purposes of this analysis, we define a farm as having 40 acres of arable 
land with a lake or stream adjacent to the field.  Prior to the trading program, a farm can 
be one of 12 general types: 
·  plant on all 40 acres, using conventional tillage (Q), conservation tillage (QC), a 
NMP (QN), or both conservation tillage and a NMP (QNC); 
·  have a riparian grassed buffer (RGB) around a lake, taking two acres out of 
production, and using conventional tillage (S1), conservation tillage (S1C), a 
NMP (S1N), or both conservation tillage and a NMP (S1NC); 
·  have an RGB on both sides of a stream, taking four acres out of production, and 
using conventional tillage (S2), conservation tillage (S2C), a NMP (S2N), or both 
conservation tillage and a NMP (S2NC).   
Farms with RGBs are defined as good stewards, since they are meeting the PADEP 
minimum standards.  Farms without RGBs are defined as poor stewards, even though 
they may be using conservation tillage or nutrient management; they have not adopted 
the riparian buffers required to meet the PADEP guidelines. 
  The farms in the Conestoga watershed are on one of four land capability classes 
(LCCs), which measure land quality.  LCC1 land has the highest quality and LCC4 has 
the lowest quality.  We modeled each farm type on each LCC, giving us 48 farm types 
before market entry.  The potential for each farm type to participate in the market under 
the two baseline scenarios is evaluated with the economic model.    For the remainder of this paper we refer to farm types before and after market 
entry by their LCC and BMP codes. For example, an LCC4 farm with a riparian buffer 
around a lake and using conservation tillage prior to market entry is referred to as L4S1C.  
If this farm adopts nutrient management after market entry, its designation is 
L4S1CS1CN. 
 
Minimum Standard Baseline 
Under the Minimum Standard Baseline (MSB), farmers with RGBs (S1 or S2 
type farms) prior to market entry are eligible to sell credits on any additional changes in 
management they make.  These are the good stewards.  Farms without RGBs (Q-type 
farms) cannot enter the market until RGBs are installed.  These are the poor stewards.  
For the purposes of this analysis, farmers are not allowed to discontinue a conservation 
practice (conservation tillage or a nutrient management plan) they are using in the pre-
market situation.   
Table 1 summarizes the trading possibilities.  All farm types designated by a “Q” 
before market entry are the “poor” stewards.  There are 16 in all, accounting for the four 
LCCs.  Those farm types designated by “S1” or S2” are the good stewards.  There are 32 
of these.  Those actions that result in tradable credits are denoted by a “y” in the cells; 40 
by good stewards and 40 by poor stewards (4 LCCs for each cell).  The table also shows 
acres in production before and after market entry.  The shaded cells show the baseline for 
calculating credits.  For example, a farm planting on all 40 acres and using conventional 
tillage (Q) can enter the market only by installing an RGB and then adopting another 
conservation practice (conservation tillage or nutrient management).  No credits are earned by simply adopting the RGB.  Note that QNC, S1NC, and S2NC type farms 
cannot take any actions to produce credits in our model.   
Figure 2 shows the estimated market entry price for each farm type.  It reflects the 
minimum credit price at which each of the original farm types will adopt practices 
necessary to create and market credits, as well as the practice that was adopted.  The 
results from the model are as expected.  Almost all the good stewards (designated with a 
“G” in front of the farm-type code) can enter the market at a lower price than poor 
stewards (designated with a “B”).  Poor stewards are at a distinct disadvantage in the 
MSB.  The lowest entry price (for farm type BL4QS1NC) is much higher ($34.85) than 
for almost all the good steward types.  Depending on the actual mix of farms in the 
watershed, and the demand for credits from regulated sources, poor stewards may not be 
able to enter the market at all.   
 
Timed baseline 
  The alternative to the MSB is a baseline based on the status quo; farms can enter 
the market and earn credits by adopting conservation practices, regardless of whether 
they were meeting the PADEP guidelines before or after market entry.  This means that 
so-called poor stewards under the MSB can enter the market and create credits by 
adopting conservation practices other than RGBs.  Table 2 summarizes all the trading 
possibilities.   
The number of scenarios that could result in tradable credits has increased to 132.  
All the additions are from so-called poor stewards who were limited in what they could 
do to generate credits under the MSB.  Not only can poor stewards enter the market without having an RGB, implementing an RGB will now generate saleable credits.  
Previously, an RGB would only allow entry into the market; credits were generated only 
with the implementation of additional practices.  Unit costs for reducing N runoff are 
much lower for many of the poor stewards, enabling them to enter the market at a lower 
price than most good stewards (figure 2).  For example, under the MSB, farm type BL4Q 
would adopt an RGB and both nutrient management and conservation tillage to enter the 
market (BL4QS2NC).  Its market entry price is $73.15.  Under the TB, the same farm 
would enter the market by simply adopting nutrient management (BL4QQN).  Its market 
entry price is now only $2.23.   
It is worth noting that under the TB, the only poor stewards to adopt RGBs, the 
PADEP minimum standard for stewardship, would be those that have already adopted 
nutrient management and conservation tillage prior to market entry; the only step these 
farm types can take to enter the market.  These farm types had the highest market entry 
prices of all the farm types under TB.   
 
Conclusions 
  Baseline conditions in a water quality trading program have a profound impact on 
the make-up of farm types that will likely succeed in a market.  A baseline that requires a 
minimum level of stewardship prior to market entry will benefit those good stewards who 
had already adopted those practices.  Poor stewards are at a distinct competitive 
disadvantage, and would most probably not find it in their interest to enter the market. 
  Under a timed baseline, where there are no practice pre-conditions for market 
entry, farm types that were labeled poor stewards in the MSB can now readily compete with the good stewards, and would likely supply a major share of the credits in a market.  
Good stewards are not eliminated from the market; however, as some farm types can still 
produce credits for a low cost by adopting nutrient management or conservation tillage.  
  The analysis shows that selecting the MSB eliminates many low cost credits from 
the market.  While this might benefit prior-adopting good stewards, it raises the overall 
cost of credits and likely reduces the number of credits traded in the market.  It also fails 
to provide an adequate incentive for poor stewards to adopt best management practices.  
If one of the goals of point/nonpoint trading is to encourage farms most in need to 
conservation to adopt BMPs, then this goal is better served by the timed baseline.  If the 
MSB is used in a trading program, then there is role for conservation programs such as 
EQIP to assist poor stewards reach the level of management that is required to allow 
them to trade in the market. Table 1 - Minimum Standard Baseline scenarios 
 
Shaded cells are the after-entry baselines for calculating credits 
y = credit generation allowed 
n = credit generation not allowed 
 
 
      After market entry 
    ACRES  40  40  40  40  38  38  38  38  36  36  36  36 
  ACRES    Q  QC  QN  QNC  S1  S1C  S1N  S1NC  S2  S2C  S2N  S2NC 
40  Q  n  n  n  n  n  y  y  y  n  y  y  y 
40  QC  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  n  n  n  y 
40  QN  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  n  n  n  y 
40  QNC  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n 
38  S1  n  n  n  n  n  y  y  y  -  -  -  - 
38  S1C  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  -  -  -  - 
38  S1N  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  -  -  -  - 
38  S1NC  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  - 
36  S2  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  -  n  y  y  Y 
36  S2C  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  -  n  n  n  y 





















36  S2NC  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  -  n  n  n  n 
                              
Table 2 – Timed Baseline scenarios 
 
 
Shaded cells are the after-entry baselines for calculating credits 
y = credit generation allowed 




      After market entry 
    ACRES  40  40  40  40  38  38  38  38  36  36  36  36 
  ACRES    Q  QC  QN  QNC  S1  S1C  S1N  S1NC  S2  S2C  S2N  S2NC 
40  Q  n  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y 
40  QC  n  n  n  y  n  y  n  y  n  y  n  y 
40  QN  n  n  n  y  n  n  y  y  n  n  y  y 
40  QNC  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  n  n  n  y 
38  S1  n  n  n  n  n  y  y  y  -  -  -  - 
38  S1C  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  -  -  -  - 
38  S1N  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  y  -  -  -  - 
38  S1NC  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  - 
36  S2  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  -  n  y  y  Y 
36  S2C  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  -  n  n  n  y 





















36  S2NC  n  n  n  n  -  -  -  -  n  n  n  n 
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i Such offsets can be used to meet the “Water Quality Based Effluent Limitation” of an NPDES permit, but 
not the “Technology Based Effluent Limitation” (citation). 